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Nebraska, for the state legislature. Adrian (1959) noted that over half of the elections in this country are nonpartisan; yet party identification is often the central variable in many voting models. Citizens are voting in a large number of elections without the benefit of their major voting cue, but little research has been conducted regarding how voters choose between candidates when their party labels are removed from the ballot. It is our aim in this article to fill in some of the blanks about the impact of the nonpartisan ballot on information and elections. Specifically, we make three claims. First, voter turnout will be less in nonpartisan elections. Second, candidates' party affiliations will have less impact on the vote in nonpartisan elections. Finally, because party identification is not readily available to voters, the impact of incumbency on vote choice will become greater. Using data on elections at the local and state level, we test these hypotheses to examine the role of information in voting behavior.
THE PROGRESSIVES VS. THE POLITICAL SCIENTISTS
We draw on two divergent theoretical traditions in developing hypotheses about the role of partisanship in state and local elections. We begin with a discussion of the Progressive Movement and the goals that they had in pushing the nonpartisan ballot, among other reforms. We find in their perspective a rather clear view of the electorate and the role of partisanship in influencing the character of voter decisionmaking. Then we fold into this more recent thinking about party identification from the voting behavior literature, particularly that influenced by the rational choice and cognitive psychological approaches. Together these views provide the set of hypotheses that guide our analysis.
The Progressives and Nonpartisanship
Progressives believed that the party machine system prominent around the beginning of the twentieth century limited direct government by the people (Duncan 1913; Hofstadter 1955; Gould 1986 ). The goal of the Progressives was to remove party politics from the local level, which would cripple the machines' powers and make municipal governments more responsive to citizens. Among the reforms that the Progressives promoted was the nonpartisan election. According to the Progressives, nonpartisan elections would eliminate national parties from the local scene and keep their divisive influences out of municipal decisionmaking.
Supporters of the nonpartisan movement conceived of democratic elections in different terms. Akin to the communitarians today, they strongly believed in a knowable, underlying public interest that men and women of good will could agree upon. According to the progressives, an active and properly motivated citizenry does not need party labels, which were seen as symbols of divisiveness and narrow self-interest. Rather, much of government was and should be administrative in nature, and hence the role of the citizenry is to choose the best leaders and managers to make government run effectively
The Progressives' normative view of the good citizen was that of the interested and involved individual, who with other well-meaning and public regarding citizens use the electoral process to select the most competent leaders who will then work for the common good. Partisanship and party labels have no positive function in this vision.
Partisanship and Political Science
Political scientists have frequently argued that political parties not only have a positive role but that they are essential for a strong democracy (Schattschneider 1942; The American Political Science Association 1950; Beck 1997; Aldrich 1995). In the liberal-pluralist vision of American politics that underlies most current empirical research, politics is more often viewed as being about "who gets what" than about discovering the common good. In this view, a measure of the strength of democracy is the character of the linkage between voters and rulers. In addition, we have come to realize that the normative view of a highly involved and informed electorate is unrealistic. Informed by rational actor theories of behavior, political science now generally accepts the view that many citizens are going to be poorly informed about, and only moderately interested in politics (Downs 1957 ). Nevertheless, more recent research has demonstrated that, in spite of these shortcomings at the individual level, we can and do achieve an electorate that is collectively rational and highly responsive to what government does (Page and Shapiro 1992; Erikson, Wright, and Mclver 1993; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, forthcoming). This collective rationality is attained, in large part, by the use of information short cuts. Party labels, in this perspective, provide important cognitive information. They convey generally accurate policy information about candidates and their low cost and accessibility help voters to reach reasonable decisions (Aldrich 1995) . It follows, then, that taking party labels away in nonpartisan elections and thereby raising the costs of information about candidates for voters, nonpartisan elections would make voting more difficult and thereby undermine the potential for popular control.
Parties also have an affective component. We know most voters have psychological attachments to parties. Empirically, from The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) on, scholars have repeatedly shown that party identification is a, or even the, central component of voter decision making. As an affective attachment, it motivates individuals to participate as a display of party support (Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1978) . They identify the teams to root (and to vote) for in contests that otherwise-because of the costs of information-most voters would have a hard time getting excited about. Thus, party labels can provide an important mechanism to aid in voter decision-making and for mobilization of citizens into the political process.
The key question, then, is what citizens do when deprived of party labels in nonpartisan elections. One option, which apparently the Progressives were banking on, is that they will seek out other, more acceptable types of information on which to base their decision. Current theory, however, would note that taking away party labels does not provide any increase in the incentives to bear the cost of a new information search. Instead, we would expect citizens to simply rely on whatever other cues they have at hand-even though these may be less effective than party affiliation as an effective guide to voting.
Previous Literature on Nonpartisan Elections
Despite the fact that most of the elections in this country use a nonpartisan ballot, very little has been written concerning nonpartisan elections. Indeed, scholars who have researched this facet of American politics readily acknowledge this lack of information as a preface to their own studies-and we shall follow in their tradition (Adrian 1959; Lee 1960 ). Adrian laid out a framework for studying nonpartisan elections that is useful for thinking about the impact of the nonpartisan ballot. Adrian argued that there were four types of nonpartisan settings: (1) those where a candidate's party affiliation is easily identifiable; (2) those where political groups, including parties, slate the candidates they favor; (3) those where groups, excluding parties, slate candidates; and (4) those where neither political parties nor other slating groups exercise much influence. In effect, Adrian sought to order nonpartisan contests according to how accessible the key information shortcut of the candidates' party affiliations are in these contests. We will draw on Adrian's idea of informal or intermediate partisanship in our analysis below.
Especially relevant to our work here is Squire and Smith's (1988) quasiexperimental analysis of nonpartisan judicial elections. They found that when voters were supplied with partisan information, the number of respondents having no opinion about the candidates decreased substantially. This not only indicated that most voters were unaware of the candidate's party affiliation, but more importantly, that voters feel significantly less confident in their decisions without partisan cues in low information races like judicial contests. We expect that party labels perform a similarly central role in most state and local voting decisions-and that the reform of the nonpartisan ballot makes voter decisionmaking significantly more difficult.
THE EFFECTS OF THE NONPARTISAN BALLOT: HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH DESIGN
The Progressives and the political scientists are at odds. The Progressives viewed parties as corrupt and thus they needed to be weakened. Political scientists, on the other hand, frequently argue that parties are important and that relying on party cues is a sensible approach for voters. While they disagree about the appropriate role for parties, our reading of both the Progressives and the political science literature suggests they would not disagree on the three empirical hypotheses we examine in this paper.
Hypotheses.
By removing party identification from the ballot, less informed citizens lose their greatest information shortcut for making an educated vote. Without the listing of party identification on the ballot and the fact that other kinds of information (i.e., candidates' positions on issues) are not easily attainable in state and local elections, nonpartisan elections require citizens to exert more effort, sometimes quite a bit of effort, to determine the differences between the candidates. This increase in the cost of voting is expected to yield fewer voters. That is, unable to determine clearly and efficiently the differences between candidates, many voters are, we expect, more likely to skip the election altogether (Rusk 1970; Lineberry and Fowler 1967; Karnig and Walter 1977; Welch 1978 ). Thus our first hypothesis is that voter turnout will be lower in nonpartisan elections.
We also believe that partisan labels have a reduced impact on the decisions of those who do vote in nonpartisan elections. The most obvious hypothesis is that the candidates' party affiliations will have less influence on the vote in these contests. It is possible for a nonpartisan contest to provide partisan cues, and even for the parties to slate candidates actively (Adrian 1959 ). However, this would have to be blatant and pervasive enough to enable the party affiliation of the candidates to rival having labels on the ballot. Moreover, as we shall see in the nonpartisan races examined here, the level of partisan activity is somewhere between low and nonexistent. Thus our second hypothesis is that voters' party allegiances will have less of an impact in structuring vote choice in nonpartisan elections.
Voters who participate in nonpartisan elections will continue to search for low cost cues because they have little incentive to invest in time-consuming searches for pertinent information. Thus, we expect that they will pick up and use other clues about candidates. Squire Our analysis of the impact of nonpartisan ballots uses precinct level data and compares relationships of precinct partisanship in contests with partisan and nonpartisan ballots. Rather than trying to sample all nonpartisan and partisan contests, we purposively sample pairs of jurisdictions in this analysis, picking those that are alike in most important respects, but which vary in the types of ballots used. In addition, we use two interrupted times series cases where governments have switched from using a partisan to a nonpartisan ballot (or vice versa) for the election of the same office. We test our set of hypotheses at both the local and the state level. For our paired comparisons, we will focus on the vote for nonpartisan offices during the period 1984-1990 in order to utilize the ROAD data set-an impressive collection of precinct level voting returns over that time period.1 We use returns gathered from other sources at the precinct and state senate district level for our interrupted time series cases as well.2 Precincts are made up of fairly homogenous groups of voters, frequently with distinctive and enduring partisan predispositions. Our strategy is to examine how these predispositions influence voting in similar jurisdictions, but which use different ballot forms.3
Before proceeding with the details of our research design, some comments are in order about our use of aggregate data in this study. The voting literature has long been concerned-too concerned in our opinion-about the dangers of the ecological fallacy As a result there has been an unwritten rule that all aggregate level analyses (which includes most non-survey research) is suspect. This means that most elections go unstudied, which is entirely unnecessary. While for some questions the scholar does need individual level data, there are many interesting questions that can be addressed quite adequately with aggregate election data. In our case, the chief independent variable, ballot format, is contextual. Everyone within a precinct has the same value, whether they voted in a partisan or nonpartisan election. Hence, the ecological inference problem of differing coefficients between variables at the individual and aggregate level largely vanishes.4 Champaign and Urbana are located side by side in the east central part of Illinois and share the same newspaper. The University of Illinois rests in both jurisdictions and many think of the cities as being one. In fact, there are often proposals to merge the cities. Although locals may see some differences between the two cities, they refer to the area as "Chambana" for short. Table 1 shows that demographically the cities are quite similar. Champaign is larger and has a slightly smaller minority population, but the cities are equivalent in their education and income statistics. The similar demographic characteristics of the cities as well as their geographical closeness and shared media market mean that Champaign-Urbana provide a good natural experiment by which to assess the effects of the nonpartisan ballot.5
The city of Asheville is the largest city in western North Carolina. Asheville previously held nonpartisan elections over 50 years ago, but had switched back to holding partisan elections, like the majority of North Carolina's other cities. However, in 1994, the city council voted to return to a nonpartisan ballot for its local elections. The Vice-Mayor, Chris Peterson, put forth the proposal because he believed the parties had too much control over financial contributions to candidates and in determining the outcome of the election (Clark 10/5/94: 1B). Although Peterson's Democratic party put up resistance to the change, the council unanimously voted to return to the previous nonpartisan format.
Our first hypothesis concerns voter participation. We expect that turnout in the nonpartisan contest will be lower than in the partisan contests because the cost of information processing is significantly higher in nonpartisan contests. To gauge this, we compare the percentage voting for mayor in the odd year local elections to a base of voter turnout out in a congressional midterm election (1986 for Champaign-Urbana, 1994 for Asheville).
Our second hypothesis concerns the impact of partisanship. This can be a bit of a challenge since the point of the nonpartisan ballot it to obscure the aggregate level coefficients of, for example, regressing voter turnout on ballot format, should be identical. We do face an ecological inference situation when we look at the partisanship of precincts and voting in state and local elections by partisan and nonpartisan elections. We are quite happy here, however, to restrict any generalizations to the group level. The political implications of our analysis would remain unchanged. 5 According to the Champaign city clerk's office, the city of Champaign changed to a nonpartisan ballot in 1917 when they implemented the city-manager form of government. (Table 2) . They have nearly identical proportions of urban populations as well as very similar educational levels. Nebraska and Kansas also vary only slightly in their minority populations and median incomes. In addition to their demographic similarities, these states also share other traits important to the study of their partisanship. According to Elazar (1984) Democratic-Republican identifiers (Partisanship) and the proportion of LiberalConservative (Ideology). Compared to the variation across the states, Nebraska and Kansas are rather similar in the political orientations of their electorates. Nebraska has a unicameral legislature with 49 members, half of whom are elected every two years to serve four-year terms (1984, 1986, 1988 , and 1990 in our data set). For our comparisons, we use the Kansas Senate, which has 40 members who are all elected in the same year to serve four-year terms (1984 and 1988 in our data set).
In Minnesota, we use the same 67 state Senate seats that were contested using a nonpartisan ballot in 1972 and a partisan ballot in 1976. We use roll-off (the change in voting for the U.S. House and for the state Senate) to measure the impact of the partisan ballot on citizen participation. Our measure of partisanship for the Nebraska-Kansas comparison is the percentage of voters registered with the Democratic party Since Nebraska and Kansas both require that citizens be registered with a party to vote in that party's primary, most voters are registered as a Democrat or a Republican, thus making this a simple and effective measure of partisanship.6 For the Minnesota case, these figures were unavailable The principle media coverage is in the Champaign-Urbana News-Gazette. By coding all articles relating to the local campaigns for the two months before each mayoral election, we are able to compare the types of information that are available to the voters when they are making their decisions. We analyzed the Asheville Citizen-Times from September 15, 1995, until Election Day to determine the extent of partisan cues available through the newspapers. Since Asheville had only changed to a nonpartisan format less than a year earlier, voters had more partisan information available to them than they did in Champaign. However, if one relied solely on the newspaper for partisan information, it would be difficult to decipher either candidate's partisanship. Of the 51 articles about the race and 327 candidate mentions, only once was there an indirect reference to partisanship. The paper said that one of the candidates stated that a previous Republican mayor was the best mayor the city ever had. The article claimed this was strange since their political views were so different.
It appears to be difficult to acquire either partisan or issue information about the mayoral candidates through the local media. We were only able to determine definitively the partisanship of the two mayoral candidates in Champaign after closely reading the local papers for two months prior to each election. A citizen paying less attention to the media would probably have missed the two partisan mentions altogether. While we are not able to gauge whether door-to-door or other types of campaigning might have taken on a more partisan or issue-based character, our interviews suggest that is unlikely The contest in Champaign is posed quite differently to voters than the elections in Urbana. It is devoid of partisan cues, and with little issue information it looks like a Progressive's model of a contest of leadership or management abilities. Even though a Democrat was running against a Republican, the context of the campaign and the design of the ballot give the race the appearance of a genuinely nonpartisan contest. While it may be easier for the voter to determine partisanship in Asheville than in Champaign, since they recently changed ballot formats, our analysis of newspaper coverage indicates that partisanship is still difficult to determine if one relies on the local newspaper for election information.
Analysis
The first hypothesis is that turnout should be lower in nonpartisan contests. We assess this by comparing the turnout in the 1987 Champaign mayoral and the 1985 Urbana contests with the turnout in each city in the 1986 contest for the House of Representatives. Since the House district encompasses both cities, this makes a solid common base against which to assess turnout in the mayoral contests. Table 4 shows the drop-off between the higher turnout congressional contest in the adjacent year and the mayoral contest. The evidence is about as clear as it can be for a sample of two: turnout dropped fully 10 percent more in Champaign than in Urbana. Of course, the small N here means that we cannot control for competitiveness, campaign intensity or any of the plethora of variables that are associated with turnout differences. Nevertheless, for the case of Champaign and Urbana, the evidence is consistent with our expectations.
While the statistics on turnout conform to our hypothesis in the ChampaignUrbana comparison, the Asheville case is less supportive. Table 4 presents the turnout for Asheville's mayoral elections in 1993 and 1995 (before and after the change to a nonpartisan format) compared to the turnout for the U.S. House election in 1994. In Asheville's last partisan contest, 12,571 voters turned out to vote for mayor-35 percent fewer people than voted for the House in 1994. In 1995, 12,217 voters turned out to vote for mayor, a drop of 37 percent from the 1994 House mark. Thus, the differences in turnout drop off before and after Asheville changed to a nonpartisan election is negligible. One explanation for these unchanging turnout figures may be that the candidates running for mayor in 1995 were familiar faces to Asheville voters. Indeed, one candidate was the incumbent mayor while the other was the sitting vice-mayor. Thus, voters may have readily recognized these candidates and avoided the information costs of voting that might otherwise depress turnout in a nonpartisan contest. Nevertheless, our evidence concerning turnout is only partially supported at the municipal level.
Next we examine the impact of partisanship in shaping voting decisions. Table 5 presents the bivariate regression using the party index as a predictor of the vote for the Democratic mayoral candidate. First, the coefficients for Urbana's elections in 1985 and 1989 are highly significant (p < .001) and conform exactly An examination of Asheville's elections yields similar results to those outlined above. In Asheville's last partisan election, the coefficient for the partisanship (.068) is highly significant (p < .001) and predicts a large amount of the vote for mayor (adjusted R-squared = .479). When Asheville began using a nonpartisan ballot for mayor, the coefficient for party (.035) decreased by almost half and became insignificant while the adjusted R-squared for that equation was only .056. Again, this analysis is supportive of hypothesis 2 indicating that the nonpartisan ballot does remove a great deal of partisan structure to the vote in municipal elections. on here is b3, which corresponds to the interactive variable. If the coefficient is negative and significant, then the effect of the party index in predicting vote is greater in partisan elections as we would expect. The combined effect of party is significant in Urbana (bl = .137, p = .014) while the interaction is strongly negataive (b3 = -.111, p = .024). This yields virtually the same slope for Champaign we achieved in Table 5 (bl + b3) = .137 + (-.111) = .026.
ANALYSIS 2: STATE LEVEL
We examine the impact of Nebraska's nonpartisan ballot on roll-off (noncompletion of the ballot by voters), as well as the relative importance of district partisanship and candidate incumbency on electoral outcomes. As explained above, voting in Kansas Senate elections is our basis of comparison. We will also repeat this analysis for Minnesota Senate elections before and after the state switched from the nonpartisan to the partisan ballot for those contests.
We start our Nebraska-Kansas analysis looking at the effects of the nonpartisan ballot on roll-off. Table 6 reports the average number of votes cast in each district for a partisan office (U.S. House was used since it is contested in each of our years) and for the state legislative office. Kansas experiences only modest rolloff as voters move from voting for the House of Representative to the state senate contests (6 percent), but over one-third (39 percent) of the House of Representatives' voters failed to cast ballots for the Nebraska Senate. This indicates that a tremendous number of Nebraska citizens, who have already made the effort to turn out to vote, do not have enough information to make a decision without the aid of a party label. In contrast, in the neighboring state of Kansas, party labels seem sufficient to keep all but a handful of voters active in the state legislative contests. Our first hypothesis receives strong support in this comparison.
Turning to an examination of turnout in Minnesota's State Senate elections offers different results from those presented above. In Minnesota's 1976 partisan contest, roll-off from voting for the U.S. House was a low 3 percent. However, this figure is only slightly better than the 7 percent roll-off figure that Minnesota had under the nonpartisan ballot four years earlier. Thus, the effects of the nonpartisan ballot on turnout are far less clear with this case. While there was a small increase in turnout when Minnesota turned to partisan elections, the difference was not nearly as dramatic as the contrast between Nebraska and Kansas. This small level of roll-off in the 1972 election may be due to the climate in which the campaigns took place. As mentioned earlier, Minnesota elections under the nonpartisan ballots were often partisan affairs where most candidates typically ran openly as liberals and conservatives. Because this was the case, it may have been far easier for Minnesota voters to receive partisan information about their state legislative candidates than it is for Nebraska voters to do the same.
We examine the impact of partisanship and incumbency in Table 7 .9 Here we work with the precinct voting data aggregated to the legislative district level.10 9 Note that a few races were dropped from our analysis of Nebraska since we were unable to determine the partisanship of the candidates after extensive research. A few races were dropped from the Minnesota analysis when candidates were running unopposed. 10 For the Nebraska and Kansas cases, we used precinct level data that we then aggregated up to the legislative district level. Note that running the analyses for these states at both the precinct and district levels yielded similar results indicating that there is no aggregation bias present. Also note the vote totals for Democratic legislators in Kansas, the impact is far greater in Nebraska. Indeed, incumbency appears to exert almost twice the effect in the nonpartisan Nebraska elections than it does in partisan Kansas (.113 versus .067). In Nebraska, incumbency status is worth an increase in over 11 percent of the vote, whereas it is less than 7 percent in Kansas. This supports our third hypothesis that voters in nonpartisan formats would have to depend on other voting cues more than they do in partisan elections. These findings about the relative effects of district partisanship and incumbency are quite robust. A pooled analysis reveals that the differences are clearly significant, and replicating the analysis using precincts, rather than legislative districts, as the units of analysis reveal the same patterns reported here in all respects." The analysis of Minnesota's state Senate elections before and after their switch from nonpartisan to partisan ballots reinforces the findings from above. First, when Minnesota returned to a partisan contest, the coefficient for the district partisanship increase about 40 percent in its value from .048 to .080. The coefficients are both significant at p < .001. This indicates the increased role of partisanship on the vote when party labels are listed on the ballot. The temporal difference in Minnesota is less than the cross-sectional Kansas-Nebraska comparison and this would be consistent with the differences in the informal Teams Without Uniforms partisanship noted earlier: Nebraska does run what appear to be nonpartisan elections whereas in Minnesota candidates running were generally clearly aligned with groups that were party affiliated. That seems to have been enough to provide a partisan cue to many voters, but actually having party labels on the ballot resulted in a significantly greater alignment of vote and district partisanship.
Second, during this change from nonpartisan to partisan ballots, the effect of incumbency on the vote was more than halved from .100 (p < .001) to .048 (p < .01). In other words, while incumbency was worth an additional 10 percent of the vote in the nonpartisan era of Minnesota's state senate elections, it was worth less than 5 percent when party labels were added to the ballot. Thus, the case of Minnesota also supports hypotheses 2 and 3-the effect of party is reduced in nonpartisan elections while the incumbency effect increases when no party labels are present.
The findings from our Nebraska-Kansas and Minnesota cases compliment those from our municipal level analyses. In both cases, the findings concerning the effects of the nonpartisan ballot on participation were mixed. On the other hand, all four cases were clear in demonstrating that the vote for nonpartisan offices was much less partisan-driven than in the comparable partisan elections. Furthermore, the examination of state senate elections demonstrated that when party was removed from the ballot, voters relied much more heavily on incumbency.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The analysis of mayoral and state Senate elections has produced strong confirmation for two hypotheses (and weaker support for a third) about nonpartisan elections: in some cases participation is pushed down and in all cases voting is affected less by partisanship and more by incumbency Removing party from the ballot takes away or weakens partisan considerations from voters' decisions, both in situations where campaign activists do not reinsert partisanship and in those where the partisanship of the candidate is more obvious (such as in Minnesota). In addition, we find, consistent with the views of voters as cognitive misers, that without partisan cues voters rely on the next most obvious low cost voting cueincumbency-which represents some combination of candidate name familiarity, less uncertainty about the candidate, and satisfactions with performance in office.
Our analysis raises an intriguing question about the nonpartisan reform. When voters are unable to draw on party cues to make their decisions in nonpartisan elections, then what does structure these choices? We have suggested and tested one possible answer to this question-incumbency-and found some support for its use. Indeed, it seems that pure name recognition may drive voters' choices when they are left without a partisan cue on the ballot. However, much of the variance in voting in these elections remained unexplained and one can imagine any number of other factors that might influence a decision that is not bound by partisanship. While one can hope with the Progressives that such Political Research Ouarterlv decisions are informed by knowledge about the policy positions, experience and competence of the candidates, previous research suggests that it is more likely that voters just rely on other low cost cues such as an ethnic or gender-specific name (Squire and Smith 1988).
There is also plenty of room here for campaigns to have an impact. In such low information environments, even a modestly effective campaign might have substantial effects where voters have few readily available pointers on who they should support.
Earlier, we mentioned that the nonpartisan ballot was intended to remove the corrupting influence of parties and force voters to seek other sources of information which would, in turn, lead to a more informed vote choice. Indeed, our analysis shows that the nonpartisan ballot succeeds in greatly reducing the influence of partisanship on citizens' vote choices. Therefore, as far as party being removed from the electoral process, the nonpartisan ballot has been quite effective in the sample of races we have examined. How one judges the effects we have uncovered depends on one's view of the electorate. More recent works in political science give voters some leeway for lower levels of information, arguing that, given information costs, voting on the basis of cues like partisanship is quite reasonable (Fiorina 1981; Popkin 1994) . One implication of this perspective is that since nonpartisan ballots raise the information costs to citizens, the nonpartisan ballot would result in less informed voting decisions and thereby would undermine democratic accountability and representation.
The Progressives might, however, be quite pleased with our findings. If one views elections in communitarian terms-where elections serve to select wise and able leaders who pursue the common good-then divisive cues to group self-interests are inappropriate. That partisanship has only a small role would be applauded. Further, the Progressives were quite willing to make distinctions about the quality of voters. Those who took the trouble to become informed were better for democracy than those easily mobilized by the parties for narrow selfinterest. Thus, our finding that in some cases the nonpartisan ballot results in substantial numbers not participating would be seen as a blessing, not a shortcoming of the reform. It was the Progressives, after all, who brought us voter registration which is widely regarded as an important brake on turnout in American elections (Powell 1986; Lijphart 1997) .
Finally, the underlying tone of much political science research on incumbency is that the advantage incumbents have is a cause for worry. From this perspective, the tendency of incumbents to do even better in nonpartisan elections is not at all desirable. Without a means of connecting voter policy preferences to their ballots, the representation connection is severed. Incumbents win regardless of what they stand for or what voters want. For the Progressives, however, governing is less about resolving conflicting interests than in choosing leaders whom will work in the public interest. Taking self-interested promoting cues like partisanship out so that leaders are evaluated more consistently on whether they are doing a good job is, for them, a move in the right direction. In summary, we find substantial evidence that the nonpartisan ballot "works. To analyze properly the vote for the Champaign-Urbana, Asheville, and Minnesota analyses, it was necessary to create a variable representing the underlying partisanship in the precincts and senate districts. Using the vote for partisan state and national offices, a party index was created for each analysis. Using factor analysis, all offices that loaded on the first factor in each case were scored to create the index (in no cases did any offices load on any factor other than the first). This factor score then became the variable for underlying partisanship. More information on how each specific index was created is presented below.
Champaign-Urbana
The ROAD data was used to create the party index for this analysis. A different party index was created for each election cycle and the prior year's partisan contests were used for its creation. In other words, elections from November of 1984 determined the index that we used for our analysis of the elections held in April of 1985. This time span represents a matter of a few months and should not be problematic considering the stability of voting patterns at the precinct level. Below is a list of offices that loaded on our factor in each year of our analysis. 
1984: President

